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DIRECTORS ON CORPORATE BOARDS MAY 
STILL RELY ON THEIR OWN RELIANCE ON 
DIRECTOR AND EXPERT REPORTS  
(IN MOST CASES) 
Grant Thomas Williamson* 
 In his presentation,1 Professor Douglas K. Moll analyzes the 
language that the Delaware Supreme Court chose to employ in Smith v. 
Van Gorkom in holding that the directors were not entitled to defend a 
claim that they breached their fiduciary duty of  care on the ground that 
they were relying on a report made by a corporate officer.2 Since the 
directors in Smith v. Van Gorkom did not have any traditional red flags to 
inform them that the report was uninformed, Professor Moll cautions that 
“[t]aken literally, the court’s statement seems to suggest that directors 
cannot rely upon an uninformed report—even if  the directors have no 
notice that the report is uninformed.”3 Professor Moll ultimately 
concludes that this was not the court’s intent in Smith v. Van Gorkom, and 
that the court merely sought to “reaffirm the general rule – i.e., directors 
may not rely on information if  they are on notice that the reliance is 
unwarranted.”4 
 My comment will seek to further substantiate Professor Moll’s 
comment as well as analyze how Tennessee courts have discussed the 
reliance defense that directors have in response to claims of  breach of  
                                               
* Grant Williamson is a third-year law student at the University of  Tennessee College of  
Law. The author was asked to provide a comment in response to Professor Douglas K. 
Moll’s CLE presentation, See Douglas Moll, Breach of  Fiduciary Duty and the Defense of  
Reliance on Experts, 20 TENN. J. BUS. L. 719 (2019), which consists of  material excerpted 
from DOUGLAS K. MOLL & ROBERT A. RAGAZZO, CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS § 
6.02[C][2][b] (2017). 
1 “Reliance on Information from Officers and Other Experts,” consisting of  material 
excerpted from DOUGLAS K. MOLL & ROBERT A. RAGAZZO, CLOSELY HELD 
CORPORATIONS § 6.02[C][2][b] (2017). 
2 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874-75 (Del. 1985) (holding that although “[u]nder 
8 Del.C. § 141 (e), ‘directors are fully protected in relying in good faith on reports made 
by officers’” the directors in the case at hand did not enjoy this protection because “Van 
Gorkom was basically uninformed as to the essential provisions of  the very document 
about which he was talking” when presenting to the board). 
3 Moll, supra note 2.   
4 Id.  
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fiduciary duty of  care. First, Part I will analyze the language used by the 
Delaware Supreme Court and seek to show that while the court may have 
spoken too strongly in reaching their holding, the true intent was simply, 
as Professor Moll posits, to reaffirm that directors cannot rely on reports 
when their reliance is not warranted. Next, Part II will discuss Sixth Circuit 
and Tennessee case law citing Smith v. Van Gorkom and how these courts 
have clarified that the general rule still applies. Part III will analyze and 
parse out Tennessee’s corporate statutes concerning the reliance defense. 
Finally, Part IV will use Tennessee case law to illustrate whether directors 
may use their reliance on reports as a defense when claims that they 
breached their fiduciary duty of  care are brought against them.  
I. WHY THE DELAWARE SUPREME COURT REACHED ITS 
HOLDING IN SMITH V. VAN GORKOM 
At first glance, the Delaware Supreme Court’s holding in Smith v. 
Van Gorkom is troublesome for directors serving on corporate boards: 
directors are not entitled to rely on reports that were uninformed even in 
the absence of  some kind of  red flag that the report was uninformed.5 
Taken literally, the court seems to suggest that directors may be held liable 
for breaching their fiduciary duty of  care when they rely on a report that 
was not adequately informed even if  they had no reason to suspect that 
was the case. This holding would add another layer to the reliance defense6; 
it would no longer be enough that the board of  directors relied in good 
faith on a report that they had reason to believe was adequate.7 Reading 
the court’s holding in this manner would require three things of  the board 
of  directors before they could rely on the reliance defense: 1) the director 
would have to rely on the report in good faith; 2) the director would need 
to reasonably believe that the report was prepared by someone whose 
professional expertise encompasses the subject matter of  the report and 
whom was carefully selected by the corporation; and 3) the directors would 
now be additionally required to perform an independent analysis of  the 
report to determine whether or not they believe the report’s preparer was 
                                               
5 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874–75 
6 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2016) (“A member of  the board of  directors, or a 
member of  any committee designated by the board of  directors, shall, in the performance 
of  such member’s duties, be fully protected in relying in good faith upon the records of  
the corporation and upon such information, opinions, reports or statements presented 
to the corporation by any of  the corporation’s officers or employees, or committees of  
the board of  directors, or by any other person as to matters the member reasonably 
believes are within such other person’s professional or expert competence and who has 
been selected with reasonable care by or on behalf  of  the corporation.”). 
7 Id. 
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adequately informed, even if  there were no signs that would indicate this 
possibility.8 
Fortunately for corporate boards of  directors moving forward, the 
court’s reasoning in Van Gorkom illustrates that their holding was not 
meant to transform the reliance defense, only to affirm its viability and 
illustrate how it did not apply under the specific case’s factual 
circumstances. The expression “bad facts lead to bad law” is often used in 
the legal profession; in this case, bad facts seem to have led the Delaware 
Supreme Court to overstate their holding. In reaching their conclusion, 
however, the court noted that the directors had to make further inquiry 
into the report presented to them because of: “all of  the surrounding 
circumstances -- hastily calling the meeting without prior notice of  its 
subject matter, the proposed sale of  the Company without any prior 
consideration of  the issue or necessity therefor, the urgent time 
constraints imposed by Pritzker, and the total absence of  any 
documentation whatsoever[.]”9 
Because of  the unique factual circumstances surrounding the 
board of  directors’ decision to rely on what the court deemed an 
uninformed report, the Delaware Supreme Court reasoned that the board 
of  directors had a duty to inquire further into the nature of  the report and 
how its conclusions were reached.10 The court had stated prior in its 
opinion that “the concept of  gross negligence is also the proper standard 
for determining whether a business judgment reached by a board of  
directors was an informed one.”11 Taken altogether, it is evident that the 
Delaware Supreme Court only intended to reaffirm the general rule that 
directors are entitled to the reliance defense when, as mentioned earlier, 
1) the director relied on the report in good faith and 2) the director 
reasonably believed that the report was prepared by someone whose 
professional expertise encompasses the subject matter of  the report and 
whom was carefully selected by the corporation.12 The court determined 
that reliance was not warranted here, however, because of  the bad facts 
surrounding the presentation of  the report; those facts led the court to 
hold that the board of  directors was not entitled to rely on the report.13 In 
                                               
8 Id. 
9 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 875. 
10 See id. 
11 Id. at 873. 
12 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2016)  
13 Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 875 (“At a minimum for a report to enjoy the status conferred 
by [Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(e)] it must be pertinent to the subject matter upon which 
736 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 20 
 
essence, the board of  directors should have known that there might be 
issues with the hastily prepared report and they were therefore grossly 
negligent in not conducting further inquiry to determine whether the 
report was informed or uninformed.14 
 The Delaware Supreme Court held that the directors breached 
their fiduciary duty of  care because of: the haste with which the report 
was prepared; the lack of  prior discussion of  the transaction at issue; the 
urgency that time presented in the transaction; and the lack of  
documentation presented which should have served as red flags to the 
board of  directors that the report was not adequately informed.15 In 
essence, the circumstances in Van Gorkom were such blatant indicators that 
the report might be uninformed that the court felt the board of  directors 
were grossly negligent in relying on what was ultimately determined to be 
an uninformed report and not inquiring further to determine that it was 
uninformed. The court’s reasoning, however, does not suggest that all 
directors must now inquire into reports to determine whether or not they 
are informed and worthy of  reliance; all that is required is that when red 
flags appear or the circumstances under which the report is prepared are 
suspect, that the directors perform some further inquiry to determine 
whether or not they are warranted in relying on that report. 
II. TENNESSEE’S HANDLING OF SMITH V. VAN GORKOM 
Of  the Tennessee cases citing Van Gorkom that I was able to find, 
none of  the courts cited the case for the specific issue that this comment 
addresses. 
When the Sixth Circuit has had occasion to cite Van Gorkom for 
cases coming to the Sixth Circuit out of  Tennessee, the court has not gone 
to the extreme of  advocating that directors cannot rely upon uninformed 
                                               
a board is called to act, and otherwise be entitled to good faith, not blind, reliance. 
Considering all of  the surrounding circumstances -- hastily calling the meeting without 
prior notice of  its subject matter, the proposed sale of  the Company without any prior 
consideration of  the issue or necessity therefor, the urgent time constraints imposed by 
Pritzker, and the total absence of  any documentation whatsoever -- the directors were 
duty bound to make reasonable inquiry of  Van Gorkom and Romans, and if  they had 
done so, the inadequacy of  that upon which they now claim to have relied would have 
been apparent.”). 
14 Id. at 884 (“We conclude that the Board acted in a grossly negligent manner . . . and 
that Van Gorkom’s representations on which the Board based its actions do not 
constitute ‘reports’ under [DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8], § 141(e) on which the directors could 
reasonably have relied.”). 
15 See id. at 875. 
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reports even in the absence of  red flags16 and has clarified that the 
directors in Van Gorkom were not warranted in relying on the reports at 
issue because of  their “lack of  knowledge and the swiftness of  
deliberation.”17  
III. TENNESSEE’S CORPORATE RELIANCE STATUTES 
 Tennessee has two corporate statutes that outline when directors 
may defend their actions because they were relying on a report prepared 
by a corporate officer. The first statute, Tennennessee Code Annotated § 
48-18-301, provides the standards applicable for directors on the boards 
of  for-profit corporations. The second statute, Tennessee Code 
Annotated § 48-58-301, provides similar guidance for directors serving on 
boards of  nonprofit corporations. 
 The statutes generally require that a director must perform all his 
or her duties in good faith and reasonably given the circumstances.18 The 
statutes use the word “shall” in describing the requirement that directors 
must perform their duties in good faith and in a reasonable manner, which 
implies that this is a threshold requirement for the directors to meet in 
order to be entitled to the reliance defenses outlined later in the statutes.19  
 The statutes20 then go on to provide what this comment has been 
referring to as the reliance defense: in discharging their duties directors 
may rely on reports that are prepared or presented by corporate officers, 
among other specified parties.21 Subsections (b)(1) of  these statutes 
                                               
16 See McCall v. Scott, 250 F.3d 997, 999 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he Delaware Supreme Court 
has specifically adopted gross negligence as the standard for measuring a director’s 
liability for a breach of  the duty of  care.”) (citing Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872).  
17 Campbell v. Potash Corp. of  Saskatchewan, Inc., 238 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing 
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858). 
18 TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-301 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-58-301 (2012). Both 
statutes use identical language and formatting in describing how directors must perform 
their duties, whether in the nonprofit or for-profit context: “(a) A director shall discharge 
all duties as a director, including duties as a member of  a committee: (1)  In good faith; 
(2)  With the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under 
similar circumstances; and (3)  In a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the 
best interests of  the corporation.” 
19 TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-301 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-58-301 (2012). 
20 Id.  
21 Here the statutes differ slightly. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-301 (2012), which deals 
with for-profit corporations states:  
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provide the caveat that directors may rely on these reports only when the 
director “reasonably believes [the report preparer] to be reliable and 
competent in the matters presented.”22 Part of  reasonably believing that 
the report preparer is reliable is viewing the presentation in light of  all the 
circumstances around it, which is something the Delaware Supreme Court 
did not believe the board did in Van Gorkom.23 
Following this reading, gross negligence would be the standard for 
determining whether a director is able to rely on a report. If, given all the 
circumstances and any possible red flags, the director would be grossly 
negligent not to inquire further into whether the report was informed or 
uninformed, then the director cannot blindly rely on the report. If, 
however, there are no red flags and the circumstances do not warrant 
further inquiry, then the director would not be grossly negligent in relying 
on a report even when it is later determined that the report was 
uninformed. 
                                               
(b)  In discharging such duties, a director is entitled to rely on 
information, opinions, reports, or statements, including financial 
statements and other financial data, if  prepared or presented by:  
(1)  One (1) or more officers or employees of  the corporation (or a 
subsidiary of  the corporation) whom the director reasonably believes 
to be reliable and competent in the matters presented; 
(2)  Legal counsel, public accountants, or other persons as to matters 
the director reasonably believes are within the person’s professional or 
expert competence; or 
(3)  A committee of  the board of  directors of  which the director is 
not a member, if  the director reasonably believes the committee merits 
confidence. 
(c)  A director is not acting in good faith if  the director has knowledge 
concerning the matter in question that makes reliance otherwise 
permitted by subsection (b) unwarranted. 
(d)  A director is not liable for any action taken as a director, or any 
failure to take any action, if  the director performed the duties of  the 
office in compliance with this section. 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-58-301 (2012), which deals with nonprofit corporations, adds an 
additional subsection under subsection (b) that states “(4) One (1) or more volunteers of 
the corporation whom the director reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in 
the matters presented” and adds the following language to the end of  subsection (d): “or 
if  the director is immune from suit under § 48-58-601.” 
22 Supra note 20.  
23 See generally Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).  
2019] DIRECTORS ON CORPORTE BOARDS 739 
 
IV. TENNESSEE CASE LAW DETAILING THE NATURE OF A 
DIRECTOR’S DUTIES 
Describing the business judgment rule, the Tennessee Court of  
Appeals has stressed that the inquiry is into whether a board of  directors 
“has acted in good faith and in the exercise of  honest judgment.”24 
Directors can be liable when their negligence has caused injury to the 
corporation and by extension to its shareholders.25 In order to truly act in 
good faith while exercising honest judgment and avoiding negligence, 
“directors . . . must be diligent and careful in performing their duties” and 
can be “chargeable with knowledge actually possessed or which he might have 
possessed had he [or she] diligently discharged his functions.”26 Therefore, if  
circumstances warrant that a diligent and careful director would inquire 
further into whether a report is informed or uninformed, a director will 
not be able to rely on that report by foregoing any inquiry.27 
Put simply, “the duty of  care required of  directors and officers is 
‘to act in good-faith and in the best interest of  the corporation with the 
care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under 
                                               
24 Lewis ex rel. Citizens Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Boyd, 838 S.W.2d 215, 220–21 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 1992) (“[L]ike other courts following the business judgment rule, [Tennessee 
courts] presume that a corporation’s directors, when making  a business decision, acted 
on an informed basis, in good faith, and with the honest belief  that their decision was in 
the corporation’s best interests.”). 
25 See Neese v. Brown, 405 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964) (“the liability of  the 
directors . . . of  a corporation is not limited to wilful breaches of  trust or excessive power 
but also extends to negligence.”). 
26 Id (quoting Fletcher’s Private Corporations, Vol. 3, 1947 Rev. Ed., sec. 1029, page 54) 
(emphasis added). 
27 See Neese, 405 S.W.2d at 580–81(“Directors, by assuming office, agree to give as much 
of  their time and attention to the duties assumed as the proper care of  the interests 
intrusted to them may require. . . .  The diligence required from them has been defined 
as that exercised by prudent men about their own affairs, being that degree of  diligence 
characterized as ordinary. If  a less degree of  diligence is exercised, the negligence is gross, 
and for losses consequent he is liable.” (quoting Wallace v. Lincoln Sav. Bank, 15 S.W. 
448, 453–54 (1890)).  
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similar circumstances. . . .28’” In order to take advantage of  the reliance 
defense, a director must be diligent in his or her reliance on a report.29 
CONCLUSION 
The Delaware Supreme Court was presented with a board of  
directors that was grossly negligent and did not act with even the minimal 
amount of  diligence that would have led them to realize that the report 
they were relying on was uninformed. While the language in the court’s 
holding might suggest that directors cannot rely on uninformed reports 
even in the absence of  red flags, the court’s reasoning shows that the 
court’s intent was simply to further the rule that a report cannot be relied 
upon when that reliance is not reasonably warranted. In Tennessee, 
reliance on a report is not warranted when viewing the circumstances 
surrounding the presentation of  the report would lead a reasonable person 
exercising ordinary diligence to conduct further inquiry into whether the 
report was informed or uninformed.  
                                               
28 Franklin Capital Assocs. v. Almost Family, Inc., 194 S.W.3d 392, 400 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2005) (quoting in part Hall v. Tenn. Dressed Beef  Co., No. 701-A-01-9510-CH-00430, 
1996 WL 355074, *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. November 25, 1996)). In the Hall decision, the 
court quoted Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 48-18-301(a), -403(a) and cited Neese, 405 S.W.2d at 
580 in formulating the language that the Franklin Capital Assocs. court quoted in its 
formulation of  what the duty of  care requires. 
29 See generally Am. Network Grp. v. Kostyk, No. 01A01-9405-CH-00219, 1994 Ct. App. 
LEXIS 619, at *21 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 1994) (“We see no reason why an executive 
officer of  a corporation should not be held responsible to the corporation resulting from 
his lack of  diligence.”  “A corporate executive owes a duty to exercise not less than 
ordinary diligence to the requirements of  his position.”).  Id. 
 
